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Interference-Assisted Secret Communication
Xiaojun Tang∗, Ruoheng Liu†, Predrag Spasojevic´∗, and H. Vincent Poor†
Abstract— Wireless communication is susceptible to adversar-
ial eavesdropping due to the broadcast nature of the wireless
medium. In this paper it is shown how eavesdropping can be
alleviated by exploiting the superposition property of the wireless
medium. A wiretap channel with a helping interferer (WT-HI), in
which a transmitter sends a confidential message to its intended
receiver in the presence of a passive eavesdropper, and with the
help of an independent interferer, is considered. The interferer,
which does not know the confidential message, helps in ensuring
the secrecy of the message by sending independent signals. An
achievable secrecy rate for the WT-HI is given. The results show
that interference can be exploited to assist secrecy in wireless
communications. An important example of the Gaussian case, in
which the interferer has a better channel to the intended receiver
than to the eavesdropper, is considered. In this situation, the
interferer can send a (random) codeword at a rate that ensures
that it can be decoded and subtracted from the received signal by
the intended receiver but cannot be decoded by the eavesdropper.
Hence, only the eavesdropper is interfered with and the secrecy
level of the confidential message is increased.
I. INTRODUCTION
Broadcast and superposition are two fundamental properties
of the wireless medium. Due to the broadcast nature, wire-
less transmission can be received by multiple receivers with
possibly different signal strengths. Due to the superposition
property, a receiver observes a signal that is a superposition of
multiple simultaneous transmissions. From the secure commu-
nication point of view, both features pose a number of security
issues. In particular, the broadcast nature makes wireless
transmission susceptible to eavesdropping, because anyone
(including adversarial users) within the communication range
can listen and possibly extract the confidential information.
The superposition property makes wireless communication
susceptible to jamming attacks, where adversarial users can
superpose destructive signals (interference) onto useful signals
to block the intended transmission.
A helper can pit one property of the wireless medium
against the security issues caused by the other. An example
in which broadcast is employed to counteract the effects of
superposition is the case of a helper that functions as a
relay to facilitate the transmission from a source terminal
to a severely jammed destination terminal. In this paper, we
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consider the case in which a helper functions as an interferer to
improve the secrecy level of a communication session which is
compromised by a passive eavesdropper. This is an example
where superposition is employed to counteract the security
threat due to the broadcast nature of the wireless medium.
We study the problem in which a transmitter sends con-
fidential messages to an intended receiver with the help of
an interferer, in the presence of a passive eavesdropper. We
call this model the wiretap channel with a helping interferer
(WT-HI for brevity). In this system, it is desirable to minimize
the leakage of information to the eavesdropper. The interferer
tries to help by transmitting a signal without knowledge of
the actual confidential message. The level of ignorance of
the eavesdropper with respect to the confidential messages is
measured by the equivocation rate. This information-theoretic
approach was introduced by Wyner for the wiretap channel
[1], in which a single source-destination communication is
eavesdropped upon via a degraded channel. Wyner’s formula-
tion was generalized by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner who determined
the capacity region of the broadcast channel with confidential
messages [2]. The Gaussian wiretap channel was considered
in [3]. More recently, there has been a resurgence of interest
in information-theoretic security for multi-user channel mod-
els. Related prior work includes the multiple access channel
(MAC) with confidential messages [4]–[8], the interference
channel with confidential messages [9], [10], and the relay-
eavesdropper channel [11], [12].
In this paper, an achievable secrecy rate for the WT-HI
under the requirement of perfect secrecy is given. That is,
the eavesdropper is kept in total ignorance with respect to the
message for the intended receiver. A geometrical interpretation
of the achievable secrecy rate is given based on the MAC
achievable rate regions from the transmitter and the interferer
to the intended receiver and to the eavesdropper, respectively.
For a symmetric Gaussian WT-HI, both the achievable secrecy
rate and a power control scheme are given. The results show
that the interferer can increase the secrecy level, and that a
positive secrecy rate can be achieved even when the source-
destination channel is worse than the source-eavesdropper
channel. An important example of the Gaussian case is that
in which the interferer has a better channel to the intended
receiver than to the eavesdropper. Here, the interferer can
send a (random) codeword at a rate that ensures that it can
be decoded and subtracted from the received signal by the
intended receiver, but cannot be decoded by the eavesdropper.
Hence, only the eavesdropper is interfered with and the secrecy
level of the confidential message can be increased. Our scheme
can be considered to be a generalization of the two schemes
in [8], [9], and [11]. In the cooperative jamming [8] (artifi-
cial noise [9]) scheme, the helper generates an independent
Gaussian noise. This scheme does not employ any structure
in the transmitted signal. The noise forwarding scheme in [11]
requires that the interferer’s codewords can always be decoded
by the intended receiver, which is not necessary in our scheme.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II describes the system model for the WT-HI. Section III
states an achievable secrecy rate followed by its geometrical
interpretations in Section IV. Section V gives the achievable
secrecy rate and a power control scheme for a symmetric Gaus-
sian WT-HI. Section VI illustrates the results through some
numerical examples. Conclusions are given in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a communication system including a trans-
mitter (X1), an intended receiver (Y1), a helping interferer
(X2), and a passive eavesdropper (Y2). The transmitter sends a
confidential message W to the intended receiver with the help
from an independent interferer, in the presence of a passive
but intelligent eavesdropper. We assume that the helper does
not know the confidential message W and the eavesdropper
knows codebooks of the transmitter and helper. As noted
above, we refer to this channel as the wiretap channel with a
helping-interferer (WT-HI). The channel can be defined by the
alphabets X1, X2, Y1, Y2, and channel transition probability
p(y1, y2|x1, x2) where xt ∈ Xt and yt ∈ Yt, t = 1, 2.
The transmitter uses encoder 1 to encode a confidential
message w ∈ W = {1, . . . ,M} into xn1 and sends it to
the intended receiver in n channel uses. A stochastic encoder
[2] f is specified by a matrix of conditional probabilities
f(x1,k|w), where x1,k ∈ X1, w ∈ W ,
∑
x1,k
f1(x1,k|w) =
1 for all k = 1, . . . , n, and f(x1,k|w) is the probability
that encoder 1 outputs x1,k when message w is being sent.
The helper generates its output x2,k randomly and can be
considered as using another stochastic encoder f2, which is
specified by a matrix of probabilities f2(x2,k) with x2,k ∈ X2
and
∑
x2,k
f2(x2,k) = 1. Since randomization can increase
secrecy, encoder 1 uses stochastic encoding to introduce ran-
domness. Additional randomization is provided by the helper
and the secrecy can be increased further.
The decoder uses the output sequence yn1 to compute its
estimate wˆ of w. The decoding function is specified by a
(deterministic) mapping g : Yn1 →W .
The average probability of error is
Pe =
1
M
∑
w
Pr {g(Y n1 ) 6= w|w sent} . (1)
The secrecy level (level of ignorance of the eavesdropper with
respect to the confidential message w) is measured by the
equivocation rate (1/n)H(W |Y n2 ).
A secrecy rate Rs is achievable for the WT-HI if, for any
ǫ > 0, there exists an (M,n, Pe) code so that
M ≥ 2nRs , Pe ≤ ǫ (2)
and Rs − 1
n
H(W |Zn) ≤ ǫ (3)
for all sufficiently large n. The secrecy capacity is the maximal
achievable secrecy rate.
III. ACHIEVABLE SECRECY RATE
Theorem 1: Let R1 denote the achievable rate region of the
MAC (X1,X2)→ Y1:
R[MAC]1 =


(R1, R2)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
R1 ≥ 0, R2 ≥ 0,
R1 ≤ I(X1;Y1|X2),
R2 ≤ I(X2;Y1|X1),
R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1, X2;Y1)


(4)
and R2 denote the region of the MAC (X1,X2)→ Y2:
R[MAC]2 =


(R1, R2)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
R1 ≥ 0, R2 ≥ 0,
R1 < I(X1;Y2|X2),
R2 < I(X2;Y2|X1),
R1 +R2 < I(X1, X2;Y2)


. (5)
We also define
R[S]1 =

(R1, R2)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
R1 ≥ 0, R2 ≥ 0,
R1 ≤ I(X1;Y1),
R2 > I(X2;Y1|X1)

 (6)
and R[S]2 =

(R1, R2)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
R1 ≥ 0, R2 ≥ 0,
R1 < I(X1;Y2),
R2 > I(X2;Y2|X1)

 . (7)
The following secrecy rate is achievable for the WT-HI:
Rs = max
pi,R1,R2,R1,d


R1,s
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
R1,s +R1,d = R1,
(R1, R2) ∈
{
R[MAC]1 ∪R[S]1
}
,
(R1,d, R2) /∈
{
R[MAC]2 ∪R[S]2
}


,
(8)
where π is the class of distributions that factor as
p(x1)p(x2)p(y1, y2|x1, x2). (9)
Proof: We briefly outline the achievable coding scheme
here and omit the details of the proof, which can be found
in [13]. We consider two independent stochastic codebooks.
Encoder 1 uses codebook C1(2nR1 , 2nR1,s , n), where n is the
codeword length, 2nR1 is the size of the codebook, and 2nR1,s
is the number of confidential messages that C1 can convey
(R1,s ≤ R). In addition, encoder 2 uses codebook C2(2nR2 , n),
where 2nR2 is the codebook size. The 2nR1 codewords in
codebook C1 are randomly grouped into 2nR1,s bins each with
M = 2n(R1−R1,s) codewords. During the encoding, to send
message w ∈ [1, . . . , 2nR1,s ], encoder 1 randomly selects a
codeword from bin w and sends to channel, while encoder 2
randomly selects a codeword from codebook C2 to transmit.
Remark 1: The rate R1 is split as R1 = R1,s+R1,d, where
R1,s denotes a secrecy information rate intended by receiver
1 and R1,d represent a redundancy rate sacrificed in order to
confuse the eavesdropper. The interferer helps the receiver 1
confuse the eavesdropper by transmitting dummy information
with rate R2.
IV. GEOMETRIC INTERPRETATIONS
When the intended receiver needs to decode both codewords
from C1 and C2, we essentially have a compound MAC.
However, the receiver cares about only C1 and does not need
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Fig. 1. Code rate R1 versus R2 for the intended receiver and eavesdropper.
to decode C2. Hence, as shown in Fig. 1, the “achievable”
rate region in the R1-R2 plane at the receiver is the union
of R[MAC]1 and R[S]1 . Here R[MAC]1 is the capacity region of
the MAC (X1,X2)→ Y1, in which the intended receiver can
decode both C1 and C2, while R[S]1 is the region in which the
receiver treats codewords from X2 as noise and decodes C1
only. Similar analysis applies for the eavesdropper as shown
in Fig. 1.b. We note that a proper choice of the redundancy
rate R2 can put the eavesdropper in its unfavorable condition,
which can increase secrecy. In the following, we consider three
typical cases: very strong interference, strong interference, and
weak interference. The analysis for general cases can be found
in [13].
A. Very Strong Interference
Fig. 2 illustrates the interference channel with very strong
interference. In this case, since
I(X1;Y2) ≥ I(X1;Y1|X2), (10)
we cannot obtain any positive secrecy rate.
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Fig. 2. Very strong interference channel
B. Strong Interference
We consider strong interference, i.e.,
I(X1;Y1|X2) ≤ I(X1;Y2|X2)
and I(X2;Y2|X1) ≤ I(X2;Y1|X1) (11)
for all product distributions on the input X1 and X2. This
condition implies that, without the interferer, channel X1 →
Y2 is more capable than channel X1 → Y1 and, hence, the
achievable secrecy rate may be 0.
However, as shown in Fig. 3, we may achieve a positive
secrecy rate with the help of the interferer. Here we choose
the rate pair (R1, R2) ∈ R[MAC]1 so that the intended receiver
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(a) I(X2;Y1) ≤ I(X2;Y2|X1) (b) I(X2;Y1) > I(X2;Y2|X1)
Fig. 3. Strong interference channel and I(X1, X2; Y1) > I(X1,X2;Y2)
can first decode C2 and then C1. Moreover, the dummy rate
pair satisfies
(R1,d, R2) /∈
{
R[MAC]2 ∪R[S]2
}
,
i.e., we provide enough randomness to confuse the eavesdrop-
per. Hence, for strong interference, the achievable secrecy rate
can be simplified as
Rs = max
pi
{
min
[
I(X1, X2;Y1)− I(X1, X2;Y2),
I(X1;Y1|X2)− I(X1;Y2)
]}+
.
C. Weak Interference
Weak interference implies that
I(X1;Y1|X2) ≥ I(X1;Y2|X2)
and I(X2;Y2|X1) ≥ I(X2;Y1|X1) (12)
for all product distributions on the input X1 and X2. Let
∆1 = I(X1;Y1|X2)− I(X1;Y2|X2) (13)
and ∆2 = I(X1;Y1)− I(X1;Y2). (14)
As shown in Fig. 4.a, the achievable secrecy can be increased
by the help from the interferer when ∆1 ≤ ∆2. In this
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(a) ∆1 ≤ ∆2 (b) ∆1 > ∆2
Fig. 4. Weak interference channel
case, the interferer generates an “artificial noise” with the
dummy rate R2 > I(X2;Y2|X1) so that neither the receiver
nor the eavesdropper can decode C2. On the other hand,
when ∆1 > ∆2, the interferer “facilitates” the transmitter
by properly choosing the signal X2 to maximize ∆1. In the
case of weak interference, the achievable secrecy rate can be
summarized as
Rs = max
pi
{max (∆1,∆2)} .
V. SYMMETRIC GAUSSIAN CHANNELS
In this section, we consider the Gaussian wiretap channel
with a helping interferer (GWT-HI). In order to introduce the
results in the simplest possible setting, in this paper we focus
on a symmetric Gaussian channel as illustrated in Fig. 5, where
the source-eavesdropper and interferer-receiver channels have
the same channel condition. The results for the GWT-HI with
general parameter settings can be found in [13].
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Fig. 5. A symmetric Gaussian wiretap channel with a helping interferer.
The channel outputs at the intended receiver and the eaves-
dropper can be written as
Y1,k = X1,k +
√
aX2,k +N1,k,
Y2,k =
√
aX1,k +X2,k +N2,k, (15)
for k = 1, . . . , n, where N1,k and N2,k are sequences of
independent and identically distributed zero-mean Gaussian
noise variables with unit variances. The channel inputs X1,k
and X2,k satisfy average block power constraints of the form
1
n
n∑
k=1
E[X21,k] ≤ P¯1,
1
n
n∑
k=1
E[X22,k] ≤ P¯2, (16)
A. Achievable Secrecy Rate
We give an achievable secrecy rate by assuming that both
encoders use Gaussian codebooks. In this subsection, we
assume that the codewords in C1 and C2 have average block
powers P1 and P2, respectively. The optimal P1 and P2
satisfying the requirements of P1 ≤ P¯1 and P2 ≤ P¯2 are
found in Subsection V-B.
Theorem 2: For the symmetric Gaussian wiretap channel
with a helping interferer given by (15),
i) if a ≥ 1 + P2, the achievable secrecy rate is Rs = 0;
ii) if 1 ≤ a < 1 + P2, the achievable secrecy rate is
Rs(P1, P2) =

g(P1)− g( aP11+P2 ) if P1 < P2, a > 1 + P1,
g(P1 + aP2)− g(aP1 + P2) if P1 < P2, a ≤ 1 + P1,
0 otherwise;
iii) if a < 1, the achievable secrecy rate is
Rs(P1, P2) =
{
g( P11+aP2 )− g(
aP1
1+P2
) if P1 > P2,
g(P1)− g(aP1) otherwise,
where g(x) = (1/2) log2(1 + x).
Proof: We use the achievability scheme in Theorem 1
with Gaussian input distributions.
Remark 2: For comparison, we recall that the secrecy ca-
pacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel [3] (the case without
an interferer in the GWT-HI model) is
RWTs (P1) =
{
g(P1)− g(aP1) if a < 1,
0 if a ≥ 1. (17)
That is, a positive secrecy rate can be achieved for the wiretap
channel only when a < 1. According to Theorem 2, a positive
secrecy rate can be achieved for the symmetric GWT-HI when
a < 1 + P2. If the interferer has sufficiently large power, a
positive secrecy rate can be achieved for any a > 0.
Remark 3: a ≥ 1 + P2, 1 ≤ a < 1 + P2, and a < 1 fall
into the cases of very strong interference, strong interference
and weak interference, respectively.
B. Power Control
Power control is essential to interference management for
accommodating multi-user communications. As for the GWT-
HI, power control also plays a critical role. In this subsection,
we consider the optimal power control strategy for increasing
the secrecy rate given in Theorem 2.
Theorem 3: When a ≥ 1, the power control scheme for
maximizing the secrecy rate is given by
(P1, P2) =
{ (
min{P¯1, P ∗1 }, P¯2
)
if P¯2 > a− 1,
(0, 0) otherwise, (18)
where P ∗1 = a− 1.
When a < 1, the power control scheme for maximizing the
secrecy rate is given by
(P1, P2) =
(
P¯1,min{P¯2, P ∗2 }
)
, (19)
where
P ∗2 =
√
1 + (1 + a)P¯1 − 1
1 + a
. (20)
Proof: The proof can be found in [13].
Remark 4: When a < 1, the interferer controls its power
so that it does not bring too much interference to the primary
transmission. When a ≥ 1, the benefits of power control at
the transmitter are two-fold: First, less information is leaked
to the eavesdropper; and furthermore, the intended receiver
can successfully decode (and cancel) the interference.
C. Power-Unconstrained Secrecy Rate
A fundamental parameter of wiretap-channel-based wireless
secrecy systems is the achievable secrecy rate when the trans-
mitter has unconstrained power. This secrecy rate is related
only to the channel conditions, and is the maximal achievable
secrecy rate no matter how large the transmit power is. For
example, the power-unconstrained secrecy rate for a Gaussian
wiretap channel (when there is no interferer in the GWT-HI
model) is given by
lim
P¯1→∞
RWTs (P¯1) = lim
P¯1→∞
[
g(P¯1)− g(aP¯1)
]+
=
1
2
[
log2
1
a
]+
.
(21)
After some limiting analysis, we have the following result
for the symmetric GWT-HI model.
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Fig. 6. Secrecy rate Rs versus P¯2, where P¯1 = 2.
Theorem 4: The achievable power-unconstrained secrecy
rate for the symmetric GWT-HI is
lim
P¯1,P¯2→∞
Rs =
{
1
2 log2 a if a ≥ 1,
log2
1
a
if a < 1. (22)
Proof: The proof can be found in [13].
When the interference is strong (a > 1), the power uncon-
strained secrecy rate is (1/2) log2 a. Note that (1/2) log2 a is
the power-unconstrained secrecy rate if confidential messages
are sent from the interferer to the intended receiver in the
presence of the eavesdropper. This is particularly interesting
because we do not even assume that there is a source-interferer
channel (which enables the interferer to relay the transmis-
sion). When the interference is weak (a < 1), the interferer
assists the secret transmission by doubling the achievable
secrecy rate.
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In Fig. 6, we present a numerical example to show the
benefits of the power control scheme to the secrecy rate Rs.
In this example, we assume that the source power constraint
is P¯1 = 2, and the interferer power constraint P¯2 varies from
0 to 8. We can see that the power control scheme can increase
the secrecy rate significantly. When a = 2, the power control
scheme uses the maximum interferer power and holds the
source power to be P ∗1 = 1, so that the intended receiver
can decode the interference first. When a = 1/2, the power
control scheme uses the maximum source power and holds the
interferer power below P ∗2 = 2/3, so that the interferer does
not introduce too much interference to the intended receiver
(which treats the interference as noise in this case).
In Fig. 7, we present another example to show the achiev-
able secrecy rate Rs for different values of a. In this example,
we assume that P¯1 = P¯2 = 2, and a varies from 0 to 4.
Comparing the secrecy rates achievable for the GWT-HI and
GWT, we find that an independent interferer increases Rs. For
the GWT, Rs decreases with a and remain 0 when a ≥ 1. For
the GWT-HI, Rs first decreases with a when a < 1; when
1 < a ≤ 1.73, Rs increases with a because the intended
receiver now can decode and cancel the interference, while the
eavesdropper can only treats the interference as noise; when
a > 1.73, Rs decreases again with a because the interference
does not hurt the eavesdropper much when a is large. In
particular, when a ≥ 3(= 1+ P¯2), the eavesdropper can fully
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Fig. 7. Secrecy rate Rs versus a, where P¯1 = P¯2 = 2.
decode the primary transmission by treating the interference
as noise. Therefore, Rs = 0 when a ≥ 3.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have considered the use of the super-
position property of the wireless medium to alleviate the
eavesdropping issues caused by the broadcast nature of the
medium. We have studied a wiretap channel with a helping
interferer, in which the interferer assists the secret communi-
cation by injecting independent interference. We have given
an achievable secrecy rate with its geometrical interpretation.
The results show that interference can be exploited to benefit
secret wireless communication.
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